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Ability Dispersion and Team Performance⇤
Sander Hoogendoorn Simon C. Parker Mirjam van Praag
Abstract
What is the e↵ect of dispersed levels of cognitive ability of members of a (business) team on
their team’s performance? This paper reports the results of a field experiment in which 573
students in 49 teams start up and manage real companies under identical circumstances. We
ensured exogenous variation in — otherwise random — team composition by assigning students
to teams based on their measured cognitive abilities (Raven test). Each team performs a variety
of tasks, often involving complex decision making. The key result of the experiment is that
the performance of business teams first increases and then decreases with ability dispersion.
We seek to understand this finding by developing a model in which team members of di↵erent
ability levels form sub-teams with other team members with similar ability levels to specialize in
di↵erent productive tasks. Diversity spreads production over di↵erent tasks in order to escape
diminishing marginal returns under specialization. The model comes with a boundary condi-
tion: our experimental finding is most likely to emerge in settings where di↵erent tasks exhibit
moderate di↵erences in their productive contributions to total output.
JEL-codes: C93, D83, J24, L25, L26, M13, M54
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1 Introduction
Decision-making in organizations is increasingly performed by teams rather than by individuals
(Hamilton et al., 2003; Woolley et al., 2010). Consequently, the optimal composition of teams in
terms of member abilities can be regarded as a valuable organizational asset. Yet, despite it being
widely believed that (cognitive) abilities of members a↵ect overall team performance, the precise
impact of ability dispersion on team performance remains poorly understood (Hamilton et al., 2012).
Specifically, we lack evidence about whether cognitive ability diversity of team members is or is not
conducive to the performance of teams. Such evidence is potentially useful for managers seeking to
select members of internal work teams, as well as being of interest in its own right. Indeed, teams
often exert considerable influence on the performance of public and private organizations since they
take decisions of strategic and operational importance.
This paper examines the e↵ect of dispersion in cognitive ability (hereafter, just ’ability’) on
the performance of business teams. We do so by creating a field experiment in which teams of
undergraduate students start up and manage a real company as a compulsory part of the curriculum
in an international business program in the Netherlands. Companies are simultaneously founded on
a level-playing field; and students face strong incentives that align their interests with the business
performance of their company. Our experiment randomizes 573 students into 49 teams conditional
on their measured cognitive abilities. We ensure a relatively large exogenous variation in ability
dispersion between teams to help probe non-linearities in the relationship between ability dispersion
and team performance.
We believe there are two principal advantages of our empirical design. First, a field experiment
can establish a causal relationship between team composition and performance, in contrast to ob-
servational studies in which members are free to self-select into and out of teams (Hansen et al.,
2006). Self-selection confounds the identification of ‘treatment’ e↵ects of team composition, a prob-
lem that our field experiment is designed to overcome. Second, relative to prior empirical studies
which have analyzed settings involving laboratory experiments (Woolley et al., 2010), unskilled
work tasks (e.g., Hamilton et al., 2003), or competitive sports (Kahn, 2000), our field experiment
closely resembles the functioning of teams co-operating on a complicated real business project. The
tasks of these teams are often complex and broad in scope, entailing the sustained application of
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members’ cognitive abilities.
The findings of this experiment can be summarized as follows. Team performance as measured
in terms of sales, profits and profits per share first increases at low levels of ability dispersion
up to a maximum before decreasing at higher levels of dispersion. Controlling for the average
cognitive ability of teams, performance is maximized at a coe cient of variation in cognitive ability
of approximately 0.25 (the sample average is 0.22). That is, firm performance displays an inverse-U
shaped relationship with the diversity in a team in terms of its members’ cognitive ability levels.
Prior theorizing turns out to be unable to explain these results. Previous theories about ability
diversity in teams have highlighted benefits to, or costs from, diversity, but not both at the same
time — predicting monotonic relationships between member ability diversity and team performance.
So, for example, if the inputs of members are complementary in team production, performance is
maximized by matching individuals of similar abilities (Prat, 2002). Conversely, if a few able team
members can impose high team production norms, and/or enable learning by less able members,
diverse teams can be best (Hamilton et al., 2003). These arguments have been applied to explain
performance in team sports — see, e.g., Gould and Winter (2009) in the case of Major League
Baseball, and Franck and Nu¨esch (2010) in the case of German professional soccer — and routinized
factory production (Hamilton et al., 2003). However, these models may be less applicable in business
environments where performance depends on the outputs of multiple tasks.
In the light of these limitations, we make an additional contribution by proposing a model
that reflects salient features of the experimental design while also generating predictions consistent
with the empirical findings. Specifically, the model posits a multi-task environment where teams
choose how many tasks they wish to perform, and seek the most e↵ective ways of performing each
task (in a set of ‘sub-teams’) to create value. We show that diversity may be advantageous in
this multi-task environment because it spreads production over di↵erent tasks in order to escape
diminishing marginal returns under specialization. However, excessive diversity may concentrate
too much production in less productive tasks which harms performance. The main result from the
model is the following proposition: expected performance is strictly increasing (decreasing) in team
diversity when productivity di↵erences between di↵erent tasks are high (low). With intermediate
productivity di↵erences between tasks, firm performance displays an inverse-U shaped relationship
with team diversity — consistent with the findings of our experiment.
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The theoretical study that is most related to ours is Hong and Page (2004). In their model, teams
have to solve a single task; and people of di↵erent abilities choose di↵erent solution algorithms. Hong
and Page show that as the number of team members increases, the ablest members necessarily
become similar in the space of problem solvers. That limits the performance of homogeneous teams
even if they are comprised of the ablest people. Diverse teams, in contrast, enjoy the benefit of
searching more of the solution space, and so can outperform homogeneous teams with higher average
ability. While our model also incorporates the idea that team members search for the best ways of
executing tasks, we generalize the setting to multiple tasks with di↵erent productivity levels. We
do not predetermine our results by assuming a particular team production function, using instead
a neutral additive structure to make our point most clearly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the context, design and
data of our field experiment. Section 3 presents the empirical findings. Section 4 proposes a simple
theoretical model which can potentially explain the results. Section 5 provides a brief discussion
and conclusion.
2 Field experiment
2.1 Context
The teams in our field experiment are teams of undergraduate students that have to start up and
manage a real company as a compulsory part of the curriculum at the Department of International
Business Studies of the Amsterdam College of Applied Sciences.1 The entrepreneurship program
covers about one-fifth of students’ first-year undergraduate curriculum. This program is organized
in collaboration with Junior Achievement (JA), which is the worldwide leading provider of educa-
tional programs in entrepreneurship (Oosterbeek et al., 2010). Companies in the entrepreneurship
program are simultaneously founded on a level playing field and dissolved after one academic year.
The experiment was performed in 2009-2010 and its context and incentives are similar to those de-
scribed in Hoogendoorn and Van Praag (2012) and Hoogendoorn et al. (2013), that were performed
at the same college one year before.
1This department is subdivided into five sub-departments/fields of study: business management, management,
trade management Asia, business languages and financial management. Students are assigned to teams within these
sub-departments/fields of study. This does not a↵ect the randomization process, as explained below.
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During the program students: raise capital by issuing shares; appoint o cers and delegate
tasks; produce and market products or services; keep the accounts; and conduct shareholders’
meetings. Hence, students execute substantial and genuinely collaborative tasks that require them
to establish roles, build up relationships, and create routines and processes in order to maximize
shareholder value. Moreover, students face strong incentives that align their interests with the
business performance of the company (see subsection 2.2 below). Each company reports to their
randomly assigned professor and business coach on a regular basis. Everything about the company
is real, including tax and social security payments. The program is not a business simulation. In
sum, students in our experiment have to coordinate on a broad array of complex decision-making
tasks that entail the sustained application of their cognitive abilities.
Companies typically proceed as follows. They start with brainstorming about potential business
activities and conducting market research to select the most viable idea. There are no restrictions
on the type of business activity that can be chosen. Simultaneously, teams appoint about half of
their members to management positions (such as the CEO and CFO) and the other half to non-
management positions, where management positions are redistributed among the non-managing
part of the team halfway the program.2 Companies further develop their chosen idea by writing a
business plan, and they start raising capital by issuing shares. Other sources of financing such as
personal or outside loans are not allowed. Once the business plan is authorized by the majority of
shareholders at the first shareholders’ meeting, business operations of teams boil down to production
and marketing of the chosen products or services. All companies are dissolved at the end of the
program and each team has to write an annual report that needs approval at the final shareholders’
meeting. Any profits are divided among the shareholders.
The college prescribes that the 573 students set up 49 team-based companies. They allowed
us to measure students’ scores in the 20-minute timed version of Raven’s advanced progressive
matrices test as a proxy for cognitive ability (Hamel and Schmittmann, 2006; Raven et al., 1998)
and assign students randomly to teams conditional on these scores. The average team size is equal
to approximately 12 students. Table A1 in the appendix lists the key characteristics of all 49 teams,
2The ability composition of the entire team closely resembles that of the management team, which is possibly
the more influential part of a team, although students rather tend to view their teams a unit and do not strongly
distinguish between the managing and non-managing part of the team. Point estimates from a regression of the ability
composition of the management team on the ability composition of the entire team are not significantly di↵erent from
1 before and after roles are switched.
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including the product or service they market.
Cognitive ability
Raven’s advanced progressive matrices are extensively used to di↵erentiate between people of higher
cognitive ability (Bors and Stokes, 1998; Mills et al., 1993; Raven et al., 1993). The test requires
subjects to select the missing figure out of eight possibilities that completes a logical pattern (see
Figure A1 in the appendix for an example). Patterns become increasingly di cult as subjects
progress. Over the past decades, Raven’s advanced progressive matrices have been shown to asso-
ciate with cognitive ability or intelligence in various ways. Elaborating on Spearman’s notion of
general cognitive ability, Raven’s advanced progressive matrices are found to measure fluid intel-
ligence (Cattell, 1963), analytic intelligence (Carpenter et al., 1990), and intellectual e ciency if
administered with a time limit (Hamel and Schmittmann, 2006).3 Test scores on Raven’s advanced
progressive matrices can be interpreted as a proxy for cognitive ability. Indeed, the correlation
between these test scores and students’ grade point average (GPA) shows a significant and positive
relationship in our sample.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of cognitive ability at the team level (panel A) and by
field of study (panel B). Panel A indicates that the average number of figures correctly solved
in the 20-minute timed version of Raven’s advanced progressive matrices test is 18.60 out of 36
figures at maximum. We do not transform these test scores into an intelligence quotient, because
that would require an additional assumption about the proper norm for first-year college students
(Hamel and Schmittmann, 2006).4 Moreover, our main interest is in the exogenous variation in
cognitive ability rather than the exact level of test scores. Consistent with recent empirical studies
involving professional sports (Franck and Nu¨esch, 2010; Papps et al., 2011), we use the coe cient of
3Spearman (1927) decomposed general cognitive ability (g) into an eductive and a reproductive component, where
(i) eductive ability reflects ”the ability to make meaning out of confusion, the ability to generate high-level, usually
nonverbal, schemata which make it easy to handle complexity”, and (ii) reproductive ability reflects ”the ability
to absorb, recall, and reproduce information that has been made explicit and communicated from one person to
another” (Raven, 2000, p. 2). Fluid intelligence, analytic intelligence, intellectual e ciency and, hence, the 20-minute
timed version of Raven’s advanced progressive matrices test, mainly relate to eductive ability. Nevertheless, scores on
cognitive tests such as Raven’s advanced progressive matrices may di↵er across time, gender and culture (see Calvin
et al., 2011; Irwing and Lynn, 2005; Nisbett et al., 2012; Raven, 2000; Rushton and Jensen, 2005).
4In line with Bors and Stokes (1998) and Raven et al. (1998) we exclude students with a test score 6 6 from the
sample. Including this group of 10 students in total may incorrectly inflate teams’ ability dispersion since a test score
6 6, in more convential intelligence terms, roughly corresponds with the cognitive ability level of elementary school
dropouts (which is highly unlikely for first-year college students). Students with a test score 6 6 most likely just
did not put in e↵ort or choked while taking the test. T-tests acknowledge that those students are not significantly
di↵erent from students with a test score > 6 in terms of age, gender, risk aversion and GPA.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of cognitive ability
A: Cognitive ability Mean SD Min Max
Average ability 18.60 2.53 14.00 23.22
Ability dispersion (CV) 0.22 0.09 0.07 0.47
B: Field of study Stud. Teams Average ability Ability dispersion
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Business management 265 21 18.74 14.07 22.40 0.22 0.07 0.47
Management 45 4 18.67 16.27 22.22 0.23 0.18 0.33
Trade management Asia 108 10 18.92 14.78 23.22 0.20 0.10 0.35
Business languages 123 12 17.94 14.00 21.86 0.21 0.08 0.36
Financial management 32 2 19.33 18.83 19.83 0.27 0.21 0.32
Total 573 49 18.60 14.00 23.22 0.22 0.07 0.47
Note: Average and CV of ability reflect at the team level respectively average score and coe cient of variation in
scores on Raven’s advanced progressive matrices test.
variation in test scores as a scale-invariant measure for ability dispersion in teams. Teams’ coe cient
of variation in test scores varies between 0.07 and 0.47 with a sample average of approximately 0.22.
Panel B shows the numbers of students and teams by field of study. It also indicates that (the range
of) average ability and ability dispersion of teams are similar across fields of study; possibly except
for the field of financial management which accommodates only two teams.
2.2 Design
The cognitive ability of students and their background characteristics were administered one week
before the start of the entrepreneurship program.5 As outside researchers we then manipulated
the ability composition of teams and randomly assigned students to teams in accordance with our
imposed variation in cognitive ability. In practice, we proceeded as follows.
Within fields of study, students were divided into four quartiles per class on the basis of their
test score, where 1 reflects the best quartile and 4 the worst quartile. Each class was then split up
in two teams, either combining cognitive ability quartiles 1+2 and 3+4 or, alternatively combining
cognitive ability quartiles 1+4 and 2+3 in a class. Hence, ’1+2 teams’ have a high average ability
and a low ability dispersion, ’3+4 teams’ have a low average ability and a low ability dispersion,
’1+4 teams’ have a medium average ability and a high ability dispersion, and ’2+3 teams’ have a
5Students were kept uninformed about their score in the 20-minute timed version of Raven’s advanced progressive
matrices test. We presented the fact that they were tested as a standard procedure of the introductory week at their
new college.
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medium average ability and a low ability dispersion. The assignment of students was implemented
one week later by the program coordinators, who were informed about the character of our field
experiment.6 Students and business coaches were uninformed, whereas professors only knew that
a research project was performed that prohibited students to switch teams. Only 6 out of 573
students managed to switch teams during the program.
Figure 1 shows frequency distributions of scores on Raven’s advanced progressive matrices test
at the individual and team level (average ability and ability dispersion). At the individual level
test scores range from 7 to 32 figures correctly solved. The average ability of teams varies between
test scores of 14 and 23, while as mentioned before teams’ ability dispersion ranges from 0.07 to a
coe cient of variation in test scores of 0.47. We exploit this substantial and exogenous variation
in cognitive ability to study the impact of teams’ heterogeneity in cognitive ability.
One might worry that the e↵ect of ability dispersion on team performance is biased since teams
of low or high average ability, by construction, tend to have a lower ability dispersion (relative to
teams of medium average ability) because they have been drawn from a truncated distribution of
ability. The scatter plot of teams’ average ability and ability dispersion, however, does not reveal
a systematic pattern that may confound a causal interpretation of the e↵ect of ability dispersion
on the business performance of teams (see Figure 1). Moreover, the results in section 3 are similar
if we include only 31 medium-ability teams with average test scores not more than one standard
deviation away from the average test score in the sample, i.e., with average test scores in the range
of 18.60 ± 2.53 (see Table 1).
Dropout rates for first-year students in Dutch higher vocational schools, where the admission
of students based on grades or previous achievements is prohibited, are on average 30% including
students that switch study and/or school (HBO-raad, 2010). The design of our experiment could
be compromised if dropouts change the ability composition of teams. During the entrepreneurship
program approximately 14% of the students dropped out (or were dismissed), which reduced the
average team size from 12 to 10 students.7 Nevertheless, this barely changed teams’ overall average
ability and ability dispersion. The average ability of teams increased from a test score of 18.60 to
6A few late applicants were randomly distributed among the existing teams whereas a few ’no shows’ were also
randomly distributed across teams (as they did not know to which team they were assigned to at that stage).
7Lower dropout rates than the national average at the Department of International Business Studies of the Ams-
terdam College of Applied Sciences can be explained by the fact that international programs generally attract more
motivated students.
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18.65, while teams’ ability dispersion remained the same at a coe cient of variation in test scores of
0.22. The correlation between teams’ average ability at the start and end of the program is 0.96; the
same correlation was observed for ability dispersion at the start and end of the program. Students
in teams of di↵erent ability composition also did not drop out more or less often (dismissals will be
discussed below). In sum, we are confident that these composition dynamics did not compromise
the design of our experiment.
Incentives
There are various strong incentives in place that align the interests of students with the business
performance of their company. First and foremost, students can be dismissed in case of repetitive
free-riding.8 Dismissal of team members requires a two-third voting majority in the team together
with the consent of the professor. It is a credible threat since the average number of dismissals is 0.35
per team and nearly 30% of the teams experiences at least one dismissal during the entrepreneurship
program. Dismissal has severe consequences. Students are excluded from the program, lose its
corresponding 12 credit points (out of 60 credit points in the first year) and endanger their prospect
of obtaining an undergraduate degree (for which a minimum number of 45 credit points in the first
year is mandatory). In section 3 we will examine to what extent dismissals vary across teams
of di↵erent ability composition and show that dismissals do not endanger the design of the field
experiment by a↵ecting the ability composition of teams.
Another incentive is provided by the grade students obtain for the program from their professor,
which has a substantial weight of 20% in their (first-year) grade point average. Both individual
and team performance determine the program grade and their weight in the total program grade
is about 50/50. Assessment of both components is based on the professor’s subjective evaluation.
Individual performance of students mainly entails active participation and professors’ perceptions of
the development of competencies such as cooperation, entrepreneurial behavior and professionalism.
An indicator of the within team variation in individual performance is the average di↵erence between
the highest and lowest program grade within a team. This was 1.5 on a 10-point scale (s.d. 0.8).
The relevance of team performance for the program grade is indicated by a significant and positive
correlation between teams’ average program grade and business outcomes.
8Interviews with program coordinators acknowledge that the main cause of dismissals is shirking of team members.
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Virtually all students own one or more shares in their companies (with a nominal value of 20
euros per share). Roughly half of the shares are owned by team members themselves; the remaining
shareholders are usually family members, friends and/or acquaintances. The mean number of shares
issued is 57 (s.d. 26.1), while the minimum and maximum numbers of shares sold are 21 and 135.
Finally, teams participate in a formal business competition. Six selected teams present their results
in a ‘business pitch’ at the end of the program to a jury of entrepreneurs who choose a winner
based on business outcomes and presentations. The winning team obtains a cup, often gets some
(local) press attention and represents the college in a national competition. All in all, the incentives
discussed above help ensure that students care about the business performance of their company.
2.3 Data
We accessed various data sources to collect information about individuals and teams. One week be-
fore the start of the entrepreneurship program students took the 20-minute timed version of Raven’s
advanced progressive matrices test and filled out a pretreatment questionnaire that mainly covered
their background characteristics (response rate: 89%). Simultaneously, we received administrative
data to assist us in assigning students to teams. At the end of the program, students filled out a
posttreatment questionnaire that queried team characteristics and processes (response rate: 68%).
We then also obtained the approved annual reports, which contain information about the business
performance of teams (response rate: 100%). The data that we collected were used to: construct
exogenous variation in cognitive ability across teams (see subsection 2.2); test the predictions of
our model (see section 3); and assess whether the assignment of students to teams was random
conditional on their cognitive ability (see below).
Business performance is operationalized by four measures: sales, profits, a binary indicator for
positive profits and profits per share. We include a binary indicator for positive profits to account
for the fact that many students view as the bottom line result whether or not they are able to
satisfy shareholders. Table 2 shows that average sales for all 49 teams are equal to 902 euros and
that profits are 24 euros on average. More than half of the teams makes a profit (57%) and average
profits per share amount to 0.62 euros. All three profit measures are significantly and positively
correlated with sales.
If we split the sample into teams of low (mean<17), moderate (17 mean21) and high (mean>21)
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average ability, descriptive statistics suggest that teams of moderate average ability perform slightly
better on the di↵erent business outcomes. However, note that these descriptives are very sensitive
to the exact location of particularly the second cuto↵ point. A cuto↵ at a mean test score of 20
(instead of 21), for example, would already imply that teams of high average ability achieve better
results. If we split up the sample in teams of low (CV<0.15), moderate (0.15 CV0.30) and high
(CV>0.30) ability dispersion, teams of moderate ability dispersion tend to have higher sales, profits
and profits per share than teams in the other two categories, on average. This ranking is rather
insensitive to the precise location of the cuto↵ points. The e↵ect of the average level and dispersion
of ability in teams will be examined more formally in section 3.
Randomization
To assess whether the assignment of students to teams was truly random (conditional on their
cognitive ability), we regress background characteristics of students on the average test score in
their team, the team’s coe cient of variation in test scores, and its square — separately for low
ability and high ability students. The selection of these three independent variables is consistent
with the team level specifications of the main results in section 3, i.e., in combination they represent
the main measures of a team’s ability composition.
Panel A1 of Table 3 shows that background characteristics of low ability students do not sys-
tematically vary across teams of di↵erent ability composition. Hence, low ability students in teams
of low ability dispersion are not significantly di↵erent from low ability students in teams of high
ability dispersion. The same holds for background characteristics of high ability students (see panel
A2). Low ability and high ability students assigned to teams of distinct ability composition are
also not more or less likely to follow a specific field of study (not tabulated).
In a similar fashion, panel B of Table 3 examines at the team level whether (average) background
characteristics of students correlate with the ability composition of teams. Again, there are no
systematic di↵erences between teams of di↵erent ability composition. GPA is a logical exception.
Since the randomization checks in this subsection fail to find any pretreatment di↵erences (that
may contaminate the design of our field experiment), the analyses in the next section do not include
control variables (adding superfluous controls would only reduce the degrees of freedom).
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Table 3. Randomization checks at the individual and team level
CV ability CV ability2 Average ability
A1: Low ability students
Age -4.825 (5.894) 16.482 (10.468) -0.029 (0.068)
Gender 1.591 (1.293) -4.452* (2.394) 0.029* (0.016)
Risk aversion -3.301 (6.071) 13.287 (12.401) -0.048 (0.070)
Grade point average 0.227 (0.807) -1.311 (1.462) -0.003 (0.010)
A2: High ability students
Age 7.163 (5.515) -10.984 (10.448) -0.057 (0.049)
Gender -1.682 (1.992) 3.388 (4.653) -0.020 (0.017)
Risk aversion -1.639 (6.008) 5.894 (11.588) 0.009 (0.070)
Grade point average 0.755 (0.499) -0.874 (0.991) 0.005 (0.006)
B: Team level (average)
Age -0.048 (5.651) 5.631 (11.485) -0.009 (0.047)
Gender -0.537 (2.333) 0.517 (5.366) -0.009 (0.012)
Risk aversion -3.195 (6.361) 10.764 (12.887) -0.009 (0.048)
Grade point average 0.371 (0.593) -0.789 (1.280) 0.020*** (0.005)
Team size -1.531 (18.318) 8.077 (39.221) -0.057 (0.135)
Note: Average and CV of ability reflect at the team level respectively average score and coe cient of variation in
scores on Raven’s advanced progressive matrices test. In panels A1 and A2 the coe cients come from a regression at
the individual level of the row variable on the column variables, separately for students of low (test score  18.60)
and high (test score > 18.60) cognitive ability (robust standard errors in parentheses). In panel B, the coe cients
come from a regression at the team level of the row variable on the column variables (bootstrapped standard errors
in parentheses; 1000 replications). ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
3 Results
3.1 Main findings
Table 4 reports regression results for the e↵ect of ability dispersion on the four measures of business
performance that we study: sales, profits, a binary indicator for positive profits and profits per share.
Panel A presents the results from regressing these performance measures on teams’ average test
score, their coe cient of variation in test scores and its square. Besides standard OLS regression,
we employ median and robust (M-estimation) regression to assess whether the results are sensitive
to outliers.
Column (1) shows that sales first increase with ability dispersion up to a coe cient of variation
in test scores of approximately 0.25 (the sample average is 0.22) and then decrease with ability
dispersion, given teams’ average ability. Teams’ average ability levels show consistently positive but
14
insignificant e↵ects in these specifications. However, columns (2) and (3) indicate that this e↵ect of
ability dispersion on sales tends to be inflated by outliers: the point estimates are insignificant when
using median and robust (M-estimation) regression estimation techniques. Columns (4) through (6)
consistently show an inverse U-shaped pattern for the relationship between ability dispersion and
profits. Again, performance is maximized at a coe cient of variation in test scores of about 0.25.
The same holds for the probability of profits being positive in column (7), although the degree of
ability dispersion where performance peaks marginally increases to a coe cient of variation in test
scores of 0.27. The coe cients in columns (8) through (10) corroborate these findings: the e↵ect
of ability dispersion on profits per share is described by an inverse U-shape with the optimum at a
coe cient of variation in test scores of roughly 0.25. The results from the quadratic specifications
in columns (4) through (10) are robust to outliers. Similar results are obtained when we exclude
teams’ average ability or include higher-order terms for the average ability of teams (not tabulated).
One limitation of a quadratic specification is that it forces symmetric e↵ects of ability dispersion
below and above the estimated maximum. In panel B we estimate spline functions allowing these
e↵ects of ability dispersion below (1st segment) and above (2nd segment) the maximum (a coe cient
of variation in test scores of 0.25) to be increasing and decreasing at di↵erent rates. The cuto↵
in our spline functions is obtained by averaging the coe cients of variation in cognitive ability
that maximize team performance (according to the quadratic specifications). Results from these
spline functions indicate that business performance tends to increase with ability dispersion below
a coe cient of variation in test scores of 0.25. If the coe cient of variation in test scores is
at least equal to 0.25 all coe cients for the impact of ability dispersion are negative and (with
three exceptions) significant. The point estimates in column (5) of panel B imply that raising
the coe cient of variation in test scores from 0.20 to 0.25 increases profits by about 200 euros
(approximately half of a standard deviation), while profits decrease by roughly the same amount
if the coe cient of variation in test scores is further raised from 0.25 to 0.30. In sum, the results
of panel B closely resemble the inverse U-shaped pattern from the quadratic specifications of panel
A, although the limited number of teams may slightly reduce the precision of its estimates.
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3.2 Robustness
Our first set of robustness checks explores other measures of ability dispersion, including teams’
standard deviation of ability (Hansen et al., 2006); teams’ ratio of the maximum to the minimum
ability (Hamilton et al., 2003); and spline functions with three segments of ability dispersion (cuto↵
levels at a coe cient of variation in test scores of 0.15 and 0.30). Second, we study whether there
is a relationship between the ability dispersion within teams and the occurrence of dismissals of
individual team members. To the extent that team members are productive, dismissals may be
viewed as an indirect and inverse measure of team performance. Therefore one would expect, if
anything, that ability diversity has a U-shaped relationship with dismissals.
Panels A and B of Table A2 in the appendix reveal an inverse U-shaped e↵ect of teams’ standard
deviation in ability and teams’ ratio of the maximum to the minimum ability on their performance,
although significance levels vary across both measures of ability dispersion.9 The degree of ability
dispersion that maximizes team performance is again slightly above the sample average. Panel C
indicates a similar inverse U-shaped pattern for spline functions with teams of low, moderate and
high ability dispersion (based on the coe cient of variation in test scores). The point estimates
for teams of low ability dispersion (CV<0.15) are positive and relatively large compared to the
coe cients for teams of moderate ability dispersion (0.15 CV0.30). For teams of high ability
dispersion (CV>0.30) the point estimates are negative and also relatively large in relation to those
for teams of moderate ability dispersion. The number of teams, however, limits the precision of these
estimates. In sum, although significance levels are consequently muted for some of these dispersion
measures, none of these robustness checks are at odds with the results previously obtained.
Panel A of Appendix Table A3 shows results of estimating the relationship between ability
dispersion and dismissals. The number and incidence of dismissals reflect respectively the number
of dismissals per team and whether or not a team has experienced at least one dismissal (dummy =
1 if any). Panel A shows for both number and incidence that teams of moderate ability dispersion
are characterized by fewer dismissals and, we infer, less free-riding. Dismissals do not reflect a
process whereby teams simply get rid of low ability or high ability students (rather than shirkers)
9The ratio of the maximum to the minimum ability in the team is the most sensitive to outliers since this measure
of ability dispersion could already be considerably inflated by only one team member of (very) low or high cognitive
ability.
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since the relationship between cognitive ability and probability of dismissal at the individual level
is insignificant (not tabulated). Hence, dismissals do not change the composition of teams in
terms of their cognitive abilities. The number and incidence of dismissals are minimized at a
coe cient of variation in test scores of approximately 0.24. Note that this minimum almost exactly
corresponds with the coe cient of variation in test scores that maximizes business performance
(about 0.25). This result is consistent with the main results in Table 4 if dismissals are an indirect
and inverse measure of business performance. Panel B indicates that, indeed, fewer dismissals are
associated with better business performance, separately for number and incidence. However, we
lack exogenous variation to identify a causal impact of dismissals on business performance since
dismissals are obviously endogenous.
4 Theory
This section proposes a simple model intended to understand how business team performance varies
with intra-team ability dispersion. We deliberately study a setting which is similar to that of our
field experiment in several important respects. Section 4.1 describes the set-up of the model, while
Section 4.2 poses and solves the team’s decision problem. Section 4.3 generalizes the model to
explore its robustness to some assumptions.
4.1 Set-up
A team (or firm) employs n   2 workers of potentially di↵erent abilities. To start with, and
following both previous work (e.g., Prat, 2002) and our field experiment, n will be taken as fixed
and exogenous. Below, in section 4.3, n will be endogenized. Teams allocate members among
several distinct tasks indexed by i. As in Hong and Page (2004), each person performs only one
task. The set of members performing the same task i is referred to as a ‘sub team’: the cardinality
of this set is mi, where mi < n. Sub-team i contributes output Xi to the team. Total team value V
is the sum of these outputs, i.e., V =
P
iXi. This captures the idea that output in business settings
typically involves a combination of several di↵erent activities conducted by di↵erent people.10
10We deliberately study an additive structure thereby removing a well-known rationale for diverse teams based on
complementarities between di↵erent tasks (Prat, 2002). Note also that allowing for unequal weights of tasks in V
would not a↵ect our central results.
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Tasks di↵er from each other in terms of their inherent productive values. Let task 1 be the most
valuable task, task 2 the next most valuable, and so on. A person working on task i generates an
outcome for that task which is a draw from an exponential distribution with parameter
 i = 1 + ✏(i  1) ,
where ✏ > 0 can be regarded as a measure of productivity di↵erences between tasks. The higher is ✏
the more dispersed is productivity across tasks. The exponential distribution is convenient because
the expected value of this distribution with parameter  i is simply 1/ i, which will simplify the
exposition below.
Analogous to Hong and Page (2004), each task output can be regarded as the best solution
to a (stochastic) search problem undertaken independently by each of mi < n members assigned
to it. That is, the output of any task is the maximum draw from the outputs of each member
who works on it. This has a straightforward interpretation: there are usually several ways a task
can be executed, and sub-teams are interested in selecting the best out of those proposed by their
members. We will initially assume that, regardless of their ability, each person can be expected to
perform any task equally well as another, and so can be assigned to any task among those available.
This assumption is consistent with the field experiment in which team members are not assigned to
tasks on the basis of their abilities, and can be rotated between management and non-management
tasks.11
Given this set-up, some restriction on the formation of sub-teams is necessary to keep the
problem non-trivial, since if anyone can work in any team, all teams can perform equally well
regardless of their diversity. We propose a restriction noting that in an entrepreneurial setting
such as that of our field experiment, team members often have some discretion about the other
team members they work closely with on a particular task. In practice, people often partner
with people like themselves (Ruef et al., 2003), a tendency known as ‘assortative matching’. For
example, evidence shows that people of a given cognitive ability tend to associate with others of
similar cognitive ability (Lou et al., 1996). Reasons include performance benefits of assortative
11The rotation feature of the experiment does not a↵ect the predictions of the model as long as abilities do not
directly a↵ect task outputs, as we have assumed. Nevertheless, we will relax this assumption in section 4.3, by
allowing individual ability di↵erences also to a↵ect task productivity directly.
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matching, even among people in exclusively low-ability groups; enhanced trust among cognitively
similar people; and greater ease of communication between them (Ibarra, 1992; Lou et al., 1996).
If assortative matching were perfect, teams would not face a decision problem at all, because
sub-teams would be perfectly homogeneous. There would be a (given number) mi people engaged
in sub-task i, and teams would be defined by the set {mi : i = 1, . . . , d}, where d is the number
of di↵erent ability levels in a team, and n =
Pd
i=1mi. This set is given exogenously in our field
experiment; hence there would be no member allocation problem to solve. And, as noted above,
if at the other extreme there were no assortative matching at all, diversity would be irrelevant as
members could be allocated freely over all tasks, and all teams would optimally choose the same
allocation regardless of their diversity.
To generate an interesting problem, we therefore assume imperfect assortative matching, which
takes the following form. Suppose there are d di↵erent ability types where d, fixed exogenously, is
a natural measure of team diversity. Imperfect assortative matching is taken to entail an aversion
by some individuals to working alongside other ability types. Specifically, we assume that at least
one member of every ability group strictly prefers to work in a sub-team associated with their own
ability type — even if that means working alone. Hence, a team with diversity d comprises exactly
d sub-teams. However, matching is not perfect, in the sense that some members are willing to
switch into di↵erent sub-teams among the d.
An example might help at this juncture. Let n = 5 and denote abilities by a = (a1, a1, a2, a2, a3),
where superscripts denote di↵erent ability groups. If there were perfect assortative matching,
the only possible configuration would be (m1,m2,m3) = (2, 2, 1). But with imperfect assortative
matching, configurations like (3, 1, 1) and (1, 2, 2) are also possible.
To summarize, each team faces a di↵erent distribution of abilities but a common decision prob-
lem, i.e., how to assign members to sub-tasks subject to: a given set of abilities of its members
(n and d both exogenous); imperfect assortative matching giving rise to d sub-teams; and a set of
exogenous task productivities parameterized by ✏. We analyze this decision problem next.
4.2 Team performance
We now derive expressions for expected team performance. Consider first a single sub-team i:
each member j working in this sub-team takes an independent draw from the same exponential
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distribution with parameter  i, generating outcomes Xij : j = 1, . . . ,mi. The expected value of the
sub-team is E(Xi), where we define
Xi = max {Xi1, Xi2, . . . , Ximi}
Letting FXi(x) denote the distribution function of Xi, we have
E(Xi) =
ˆ 1
0
[1  FXi(x)] dx
=
ˆ 1
0
241  miY
j=1
Pr (Xij < x)
35 dx
=
ˆ 1
0
h
1 
⇣
1  e  ix
⌘mii
dx
=
1
 i
miX
j=1
1
j
. (1)
The last line is non-trivial and uses properties of generating functions: see, e.g., Lugo (2011) for a
proof.
We can now state the expected value of the entire team, E(V ). By the independence and
additivity of the Xi, and using (1), teams solve the program:
max
{mi:i=1,...,d}
E(V ; d) = max
{mi:i=1,...,d}
8<:
dX
i=1
1
 i
miX
j=1
1
j
9=; (2)
s.t. 0  mi  n : i = 1, . . . , d ; d   1 , n   2 given
dX
i=1
mi = n .
At the heart of (2) lies a trade-o↵ between specialization and diversification. On the one hand,
there are benefits from having large specialized sub-teams of workers who focus on the most valuable
task. On the other hand this strategy eventually encounters diminishing returns and ‘crowds out’
(given fixed n) other people who perform less valuable yet still positive productivity tasks in di↵erent
sub-teams, who have not yet run into diminishing returns. But, benefits of diversification are limited
by the rate at which task productivity declines as additional tasks are performed.
The basic logic behind the model can be seen even in the simplest case of n = 2. The config-
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uration {m1, m2} = {2, 0} is a team comprised of two ability types, both of whom work on the
most productive task, i = 1. For this team, d =  1 = 1 and E(V ) = 1 + 0.5 = 1.5. The alternative
d = 1 configuration {0, 2} on the other hand yields E(V ) = 1.5/(1 + ✏) < 1.5. Finally, consider a
di↵erent ability distribution with {1, 1}, the most diverse of all two-person teams, d = 2: this yields
E(V ) = 1 + [1/(1 + ✏)]. Whether the {1, 1} configuration is preferable to the {2, 0} configuration
evidently depends on the value of ✏. If ✏ < 1, the diverse team {1, 1} yields higher performance;
but if ✏ > 1, the specialized team {2, 0} is preferred.
This example illustrates a point which remains true for all n > 2: the lower ✏ is, i.e., the more
similar tasks are with respect to their productivities, the more slowly payo↵s to team diversity
decrease, relative to the marginal rate of specialization payo↵s (which decreases at rate 1/mi).
Conversely, the higher ✏ is, the faster payo↵s to diversity decrease relative to those under spe-
cialization. Hence, in general we might expect to see: specialized teams emerge in environments
where task productivities are very di↵erent; diverse teams in environments where task productivi-
ties are very similar; and moderately diverse teams in environments where di↵erences between task
productivities are moderate.
Column (1) of Table 5 illustrates solutions to (2) for the case of n = 5 and various values of ✏.
Panel A of Table 5 reports results for ✏ = 0.1, corresponding to small di↵erences in productivity
between tasks. Panel B reports results for moderate di↵erences and Panel C large di↵erences
between tasks. For each panel, column (1) reports optimal team configurations, m⇤, and maximal
E(V ) for each diversity level d — from d = 1 (maximum specialization) through d = 5 (maximum
diversity). The results in column (1), Panel B show that an intermediate degree of diversity (d = 4)
maximizes expected performance with a value of 3.07. As noted above, this is exactly what would be
expected when di↵erences in task productivity are moderate; and it is consistent with the findings
from our field experiment. In panel A, di↵erences in task productivity are very small, so maximal
diversity is strictly preferred. Di↵erences in task productivity are very large in the third panel,
where in accordance with the logic above minimal diversity becomes optimal.
4.3 Extensions of the model
Having elucidated the conditions under which the model generates findings consistent with our
field experiment, we next extend it in two ways. First, we allow individual di↵erences in ability
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Table 5. Team diversity and expected performance
(1) (2) (3)
m⇤ E(V ; d,   = 0) E(V ; d, E(V ; d, E(V ; d, m⇤ n⇤ E(V ; d,
  = 0.5)   = 1)   = 2) w = 0.38)
A. ✏ = 0.1
d = 1 (5, 0, 0, 0, 0) 2.28 2.26 2.27 2.41 (2, 0, 0, 0, 0) 2 0.74
d = 2 (3, 2, 0, 0, 0) 3.20 3.17 3.20 3.38 (2, 2, 0, 0, 0) 4 1.34
d = 3 (2, 2, 1, 0, 0) 3.70 3.67 3.69 3.91 (2, 2, 2, 0, 0) 6 1.83
d = 4 (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) 4.10 3.99 4.00 4.25 (2, 2, 2, 2, 0) 8 2.22
d = 5 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) 4.22 4.20 4.23 4.46 (2, 2, 2, 2, 1) 9 2.55
B. ✏ = 0.5
d = 1 (5, 0, 0, 0, 0) 2.28 2.26 2.27 2.41 (2, 0, 0, 0, 0) 2 0.74
d = 2 (3, 2, 0, 0, 0) 2.83 2.81 2.83 2.99 (2, 1, 0, 0, 0) 3 1.03
d = 3 (3, 1, 1, 0, 0) 3.16 (2, 1, 1, 0, 0) 4 1.15
(2, 2, 1, 0, 0) 3.00 2.98 2.99
d = 4 (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) 3.07 3.04 3.07 3.23 (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) 5 1.17
d = 5 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) 2.90 2.88 2.89 3.08 (2, 1, 1, 1, 1) 6 1.12
C. ✏ = 5
d = 1 (5, 0, 0, 0, 0) 2.28 2.26 2.27 2.41 (2, 0, 0, 0, 0) 2 0.74
d = 2 (4, 1, 0, 0, 0) 2.25 2.23 2.25 2.38 (2, 1, 0, 0, 0) 3 0.53
d = 3 (3, 1, 1, 0, 0) 2.09 2.07 2.09 2.21 (2, 1, 1, 0, 0) 4 0.24
d = 4 (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) 1.82 1.81 1.84 1.92 (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) 5  0.08
d = 5 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) 1.32 1.36 1.37 1.46 (2, 1, 1, 1, 1) 6  0.41
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are for exogenous n = 5: optimal m⇤ values in column (1) apply to column (2) as well,
except for d = 3 in Panel B, where only one of the two m⇤ vectors is optimal for any given  . Column (3) is for
endogenous n; di↵erent m⇤ solve this problem, given in the first sub-column of (3).
also to a↵ect the productivity of each task directly. As above, let a denote the team’s n-vector
of abilities drawn at random from the population: denote mean ability by µ. Let ai 2 a be the
ability of a member assigned to task i. There are various ways that individual abilities could
influence productivity; we choose the following simple specification which makes productivity a
strictly increasing function of ability:
max
{mi:i=1,...,d}
E(V ; d,  ) = max
{mi:i=1,...,d}
8<:
dX
i=1
(ai/µ) 
 i
miX
j=1
1
j
9=; , (3)
where   > 0 is a shape parameter. Note that (3) collapses into (2) when   = 0.
How do the results change when (3) replaces (2) for   6= 0? To explore this, we draw n-vectors
a using data from the field experiment. Hence, for the illustrative case of n = 5, we use quintiles of
the actual ability distribution and set µ = 18.6. Noting that it is optimal to assign the ablest people
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to the most productive tasks, column (2) of Table 5 reports the results of solving the programming
problem using (3) and several values of  . As can be seen, the same patterns are observed as in
column (1): moderate task productivity di↵erences (Panel B) once again yield an inverse-U shape
relationship between expected performance and team diversity, while that is not the case if task
di↵erences are small (Panel A) or large (Panel C). Hence, the predictions of the model appear to
be robust to allowing ability to have direct as well as indirect e↵ects on team production.
Turning to the second extension of the model, we note that although our field experiment
embodies some salient aspects of real-world teams, one exception is the experiment’s restriction
of a fixed number of team members, n. We next extend the model to allow n to be endogenous,
in a setting where team members all cost the same exogenous wage w. Then the objective in (2)
changes to become
max
{mi:i=1,...,d},n
8<:
dX
i=1
0@ 1
 i
miX
j=1
1
j
  wmi
1A9=; (4)
Essentially, the team optimally hires additional members until the marginal product of an additional
member in task i equals w. Although we do not observe w for this sample of students, we can choose
a value which generates a non-trivial problem. Specifically, note that w ! 0 returns us to (2), while
if w !1, mi ! 0 8i. An intermediate value of w = 0.38 is of comparable magnitude to the other
elements of (4) and leads to non-trivial solutions, reported in column (3) of Table 5. As can be
seen there, although team sizes vary quite a lot, the same qualitative results emerge again. In
particular, with an intermediate degree of task productivity diversity (Panel B), we once again
observe an inverse-U shaped relationship between expected team performance and team diversity,
with the same optimal solution of d = 4. Results for the other panels of column (3) with endogenous
n are similar to the corresponding panels of columns (1) and (2).
To summarize, we have shown that the model’s predictions are both consistent with the findings
of our field experiment and robust to two natural and realistic extensions to the model. Of course,
other extensions could doubtless be proposed; we discuss some of these in our closing discussion.
5 Discussion and conclusion
This paper presented the results of a field experiment in which 573 students in 49 teams started
up and managed real companies under identical circumstances. We ensured exogenous variation in
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— otherwise random — team composition by assigning students to teams based on their measured
cognitive abilities (Raven test). Our experiment likely measures the causal e↵ect of ability dispersion
on team performance in a setting that closely resembles the functioning of business teams which
simultaneously undertake a range of diverse tasks. Our key finding was that team performance
exhibits an inverse U-shaped relationship with ability dispersion; average cognitive ability of team
members did not significantly improve performance. Performance was maximized with a coe cient
of variation in cognitive ability of about 0.25 — close to the sample average of 0.22.
In contrast to the predictions from prior theoretical work, we did not find empirical support for
the dominance either of maximally homogeneous teams (Prat, 2002) or maximally diverse teams
(Hong and Page, 2004). In an e↵ort to better understand the processes at work and understand
and possibly reconcile the di↵erences between our and earlier work, we developed a simple model
in which teams perform several tasks of varying productivity. Incorporating into the model the
well-known tendency of people to sort into similar groups (Ruef et al., 2003), we proposed that
our empirical findings are most likely to emerge when productivity di↵erences between disparate
tasks are moderate. Di↵erent predictions, associated with monotonic relationships between team
diversity and performance, only emerge when productivity di↵erences between tasks are either very
small or very large.
We believe this paper carries several implications for both scholarship and practice. To start
with, the use of a field experiment with stratified randomization is rather new for the empirical
analysis of team performance. We hope that future empirical research will emulate the benefits of
such an approach, especially its ability to overcome self-selection problems which have bedeviled
more traditional empirical approaches. Second, our findings challenge the tendency of prior em-
pirical studies to look for simple monotonic relationships between team diversity and performance
outcomes. In a sense, to ask whether team diversity is good or bad for performance might be to
pose the wrong question: instead, our results suggest that it may be more sensible to ask how
much diversity is conducive to team performance given circumstances such as task diversity. In-
deed, this insight finds a parallel in the theoretical model we proposed to understand the findings.
Rather than suggesting that diversity — even moderate levels of it — is invariably beneficial, the
model instead predicts environment-specific outcomes. That is, our model comes with a boundary
condition which determines the qualitative nature of the relationship between team diversity and
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performance.
Third, our empirical findings may also be of interest to practitioners: entrepreneurial teams in
practice are usually fairly homogeneous in nature (Ruef et al., 2003), though (in accordance with
the assumptions of the model) far from perfectly so. Unlike prior work, which usually counsels
practitioners that entrepreneurial teams risk being insu ciently diverse, our work anticipates the
possibility that such teams might actually be configured with an appropriate degree of diversity.
In addition, our model suggests that the concept of diversity can also be understood in terms of
the allocation of members among tasks. It may therefore be fruitful for practitioners to benchmark
‘balanced’ teams not only in terms of the distribution of characteristics of their members, but also
in terms of the number and diversity of tasks they perform and the allocation of member e↵ort
among those tasks.
A similar implication carries over into managerial settings where managers select team members
but where those members have some discretion over whom they partner with in sub-teams. In such
cases, the imperfect assortative matching model we have postulated may be pertinent, especially if
there is asymmetric information which prevents managers from perfectly monitoring and altering
sub-team composition. In such cases, managers might do best by working with the grain of im-
perfect assortative matching, by selecting strategically members into teams in order to generate a
desired degree of diversity. As our model has shown, the desired degree of diversity depends on the
production structure in a multi-task environment — a structure of which managers are presumably
cognizant.
There are of course several limitations of our study. To start with, the model assumed a
particular form of imperfect assortative matching; predictions may di↵er under alternative forms
of this assumption. The model also abstracted from multi-tasking by individuals. While this was
not important in the ‘vanilla flavor’ of our model where there were no direct e↵ects of ability on
production, future conceptual work can explore how multi-tasking a↵ects optimal team composition
when abilities do directly influence productivity in di↵erent tasks.
Second, the field experiment did not generate data about the tasks that team members per-
formed in practice, and exactly how team members were assigned to them in practice, including the
manifestation of imperfect assortative matching. Future research, possibly in a laboratory setting,
is needed to delve deeper into these deep aspects of team production.
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Third, the external validity of our empirical findings is another limitation of the study. We
exploited exogenous variation in cognitive ability among students who are young, and generally
lack work experience. The sorting behaviors and performance outcomes of these agents might not
be representative of teams comprised of older, more experienced people. For this reason, future
research might seek to replicate experiments like ours in real organizations and on a larger scale.
Yet, it should also be borne in mind that the subjects of our experiment did engage in a substantial
business project requiring execution of a broad array of non-trivial tasks; and they also faced
strong incentives as would generally apply in broader real-world settings too. Finally, one might
argue that our results are not generalizable because the student population that we study might be
representative of only a limited part (the higher end) of the ability distribution that one faces usually
in the workplace. However, based on statistics about the student population of first-year students
in a vocational college (such as we study), their entry levels, attrition rates, and the likelihood of
moving on to higher degrees, we found that the education distribution has a slightly lower variance
and higher mean than the general population (including those adults not active in the labor force).
So all in all, and despite these limitations, we believe that our field experiment remains informative
about the impact of ability dispersion on the performance of business (management) teams.
There are several other fruitful areas for future research into team composition and perfor-
mance. It would be interesting, for example, to analyze interactions between team members, both
theoretically and empirically. Possible interactions include knowledge transfers, spillovers, conflicts
and communication problems. Our model abstracted from these issues. While post-experiment
interview transcripts did not reveal a dominant role in practice for any of them, it is possible that
they might be more salient in other settings. Furthermore, experimental work which varies produc-
tivity di↵erences between tasks could check whether the relationship between team diversity and
performance does indeed switch qualitatively, as predicted by our model.
To conclude, a whole array of future questions about team dynamics and performance remains
to be explored, including the role of tastes and preferences, beliefs and (re)negotiation. These
promise to deepen further our understanding of how teams work and the best way that teams can
be configured in di↵erent circumstances to maximize performance. Scholars, entrepreneurs and
managers all stand to gain from the further development of this research agenda.
27
References
Bors, D. and Stokes, T. (1998). Raven’s advanced progressive matrices: Norms for first-year univer-
sity students and the development of a short form. Educational and Psychological Measurement,
58(3):382–398.
Calvin, C., Deary, I., Fenton, C., Roberts, B., Der, G., Leckenby, N., and Batty, G. (2011). In-
telligence in youth and all-cause-mortality: Systematic review with meta-analysis. International
Journal of Epidemiology, 40(3):626–644.
Carpenter, P., Just, M., and Shell, P. (1990). What one intelligence test measures: A theoretical
account of the processing in the Raven progressive matrices test. Psychological Review, 97(3):404–
431.
Cattell, R. (1963). Theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence: A critical experiment. Journal of
Educational Psychology, 54(1):1–22.
Franck, E. and Nu¨esch, S. (2010). The e↵ect of talent disparity on team productivity in soccer.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(2):218–229.
Gould, E. and Winter, E. (2009). Interactions between workers and the technology of production:
Evidence from professional baseball. Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(1):188–200.
Hamel, R. and Schmittmann, V. (2006). The 20-minute version as a predictor of the Raven advanced
progressive matrices test. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 66(6):1039–1046.
Hamilton, B., Nickerson, J., and Owan, H. (2003). Team incentives and worker heterogeneity: An
empirical analysis of the impact of teams on productivity and participation. Journal of Political
Economy, 111(3):465–497.
Hamilton, B., Nickerson, J., and Owan, H. (2012). Diversity and Productivity in Production Teams,
chapter in: A. Bryson (ed.), Advances in the Economic Analyses of Participatory & Labor-
Managed Firms, volume 13, pages 99–138. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Hansen, Z., Owan, H., and Pan, J. (2006). The impact of group diversity on performance and
knowledge spillover: An experiment in a college classroom. NBER Working Paper.
28
HBO-raad (2010). Feiten en cijfers: Afgestudeerden en uitvallers in het hoger beroepsonderwijs.
Technical report, HBO-raad.
Hong, L. and Page, S. (2004). Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-
ability problem solvers. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America (PNAS), 101(46):16385–16389.
Hoogendoorn, S., Oosterbeek, H., and Van Praag, M. (2013). The impact of gender diversity on
the performance of business teams: Evidence from a field experiment. Management Science,
59(7):1514–1528.
Hoogendoorn, S. and Van Praag, M. (2012). Ethnic diversity and team performance: A field
experiment. IZA Discussion Paper.
Ibarra, H. (1992). Homophily and di↵erential returns: Sex di↵erences in network structure and
access in an advertising firm. Administrative Sciences Quarterly, 37(3):422–447.
Irwing, P. and Lynn, R. (2005). Sex di↵erences in means and variability on the progressive matrices
in university students: A meta-analysis. British Journal of Psychology, 96(4):505–524.
Kahn, L. (2000). The sports business as a labor market laboratory. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 14(3):75–94.
Lou, Y., Abrami, P., Spence, J., Poulsen, C., Chambers, B., and Apollonia, S. (1996). Within-class
grouping: A meta-analysis. Review of Education Research, 66(4):423–458.
Lugo, M. (2011). The expectation of the maximum of exponentials. Course notes:
www.stat.berkeley.edu/ mlugo/stat134-f11/exponential-maximum.pdf, Retrieved: December
2013.
Mills, C., Ablard, K., and Brody, L. (1993). The Raven’s progressive matrices: Its usefulness for
identifying gifted/talented students. Roeper Review, 15(3):183–186.
Nisbett, R., Aronson, J., Blair, C., Dickens, W., Flynn, J., Halpern, D., and Turkheimer, E. (2012).
Intelligence: New findings and theoretical developments. American Psychologist, 67(2):1–30.
29
Oosterbeek, H., Van Praag, M., and IJsselstein, A. (2010). The impact of entrepreneurship educa-
tion on entrepreneurship skills and motivation. European Economic Review, 54(3):442–454.
Papps, K., Bryson, A., and Gomez, R. (2011). Heterogeneous worker ability and team-based
production: Evidence from major league baseball, 1920–2009. Labour Economics, 18(3):310–319.
Prat, A. (2002). Should a team be homogeneous? European Economic Review, 46(7):1187–1207.
Raven, J. (2000). The Raven’s progressive matrices: Change and stability over culture and time.
Cognitive Psychology, 41(1):1–48.
Raven, J., Raven, J., and Court, J. (1993). Manual for Raven’s Progressive Matrices and Vocabulary
Scales: Section 1 General overview. Oxford: Psychologists Press.
Raven, J., Raven, J., and Court, J. (1998). Manual for Raven’s Progressive Matrices and Vocabulary
Scales: Section 4 Advanced Progressive Matrices. Oxford: Oxford Psychologists Press.
Ruef, M., Aldrich, H., and Carter, N. (2003). The structure of organizational founding teams:
Homophily, strong ties and isolation among US entrepreneurs. American Sociological Review,
68(2):195–222.
Rushton, J. and Jensen, A. (2005). Thirty years of research on race di↵erences in cognitive ability.
Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 11(2):235–294.
Spearman, C. (1927). The Abilities of Man. New York: Macmillan.
Woolley, A., Chabris, C., Pentland, A., Hashmi, N., and Malone, T. (2010). Evidence for a collective
intelligence factor in the performance of human groups. Science, 330(6004):686–688.
30
A
p
p
en
d
ix
T
a
b
le
A
1
.
T
ea
m
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
#
N
am
e
A
ve
ra
ge
C
V
T
ea
m
S
al
es
P
ro
fi
ts
P
ro
fi
ts
/
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
of
p
ro
d
u
ct
/s
er
vi
ce
ab
il
it
y
ab
il
it
y
si
ze
(e
u
ro
s)
(e
u
ro
s)
sh
ar
e
1
A
ch
te
r
d
e
ri
ts
17
.6
4
0.
33
11
53
3.
95
78
.2
0
1.
56
S
u
st
ai
n
ab
le
fa
ir
tr
ad
e
b
ox
er
sh
or
t
2
B
e
P
or
ta
b
le
16
.0
0
0.
22
10
11
79
.5
8
28
8.
30
4.
65
P
or
ta
b
le
d
u
ra
b
le
w
at
er
b
ot
tl
e
3
B
er
ry
E
m
ot
io
n
s
21
.4
5
0.
26
12
88
.2
4
-5
91
.5
8
-1
3.
76
P
er
so
n
al
iz
ed
te
le
p
h
on
e
co
ve
r
4
B
lu
e
E
m
p
ir
e
14
.0
9
0.
19
13
41
8.
07
-7
5.
44
-1
.8
0
F
as
h
io
n
ab
le
b
lu
et
oo
th
b
ra
ce
le
t
5
C
le
an
in
g
E
nv
.
F
ri
en
d
ly
14
.7
5
0.
31
8
41
5.
76
3.
72
0.
06
L
on
g-
la
st
in
g
d
u
ra
b
le
p
ap
er
to
w
el
6
C
h
or
i-
C
h
or
i
16
.6
2
0.
20
15
58
8.
24
-4
41
.0
0
-3
.9
4
T
re
n
d
y
cu
st
om
iz
ed
In
d
ia
n
je
w
el
ry
7
C
om
b
.
Y
ou
n
g
E
’s
h
ip
15
.1
3
0.
19
9
89
4.
12
11
9.
90
2.
45
W
h
is
tl
in
g
op
er
at
ed
ke
y
fi
n
d
er
8
C
ov
er
s
’n
C
as
es
19
.3
6
0.
37
16
33
8.
87
56
.1
0
1.
52
C
ov
er
s
an
d
ca
se
s
fo
r
te
le
p
h
on
es
9
E
as
yl
if
e
19
.1
3
0.
32
12
20
7.
18
-2
88
.7
9
-8
.2
5
A
u
to
m
at
ed
to
ot
h
p
as
te
d
is
p
en
se
r
10
F
la
sh
in
g
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
s
16
.7
0
0.
31
12
61
5.
88
90
.3
4
1.
96
F
lu
or
es
ce
nt
n
ig
ht
li
fe
b
ra
ce
le
t
11
F
re
sH
E
S
15
.0
8
0.
20
15
35
05
.3
5
14
5.
51
3.
10
W
in
e
b
ot
tl
e
sh
ap
ed
u
m
b
re
ll
a
12
F
re
sh
u
al
22
.0
8
0.
15
13
15
99
.6
6
35
2.
81
4.
58
C
on
ve
n
ie
nt
co
m
p
ac
t
ke
y
to
rc
h
13
G
re
en
19
.5
0
0.
21
10
52
4.
37
11
1.
81
4.
66
U
nb
re
ak
ab
le
va
se
fo
r
fl
ow
er
s
14
G
re
en
S
ol
u
ti
on
s
14
.0
7
0.
31
14
15
76
.3
8
37
5.
65
9.
89
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l
aw
ar
en
es
s
p
ro
d
u
ct
s
15
H
or
an
je
17
.3
8
0.
33
14
46
3.
87
36
.5
5
0.
52
G
if
t
b
ag
w
it
h
D
u
tc
h
so
u
ve
n
ir
s
16
Ib
re
ll
a
17
.1
8
0.
18
12
23
8.
66
-4
73
.7
9
-6
.9
7
E
as
y-
to
-w
ea
r
m
in
i
u
m
b
re
ll
a
17
I-
co
rp
or
at
io
n
16
.2
7
0.
22
15
43
.1
5
-6
36
.8
1
-9
.6
5
C
on
ve
n
ie
nt
ey
e-
d
ro
p
d
is
p
en
se
r
18
I’
M
ag
in
e
18
.8
3
0.
21
15
32
67
.6
6
70
2.
89
5.
81
F
as
h
io
n
ab
le
B
ra
zi
li
an
fl
ip
-fl
op
s
19
In
n
ov
ar
t
22
.4
0
0.
16
12
42
.0
2
-8
.4
0
-0
.2
0
B
ro
ke
r/
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ry
in
ar
t
20
Ji
ko
n
i
18
.5
6
0.
20
10
86
1.
05
54
.2
6
1.
36
In
n
ov
at
iv
e
ki
tc
h
en
ap
p
li
an
ce
s
21
K
am
ik
ar
e
17
.5
0
0.
18
10
57
7.
98
27
.0
5
0.
52
E
as
y-
to
-u
se
h
ai
r
st
yl
in
g
p
ro
d
u
ct
22
K
’d
ea
u
19
.8
3
0.
32
17
87
8.
00
12
0.
00
1.
74
G
if
t
b
ox
w
it
h
va
ri
ou
s
ga
d
ge
ts
23
K
ey
en
19
.0
0
0.
13
13
15
25
.7
9
25
6.
11
3.
41
H
ig
h
-q
u
al
it
y
ke
y
fi
n
d
er
d
ev
ic
e
24
L
ig
ht
d
an
ce
r
16
.1
7
0.
47
13
13
9.
79
-5
95
.7
7
-7
.8
4
Je
w
el
ry
w
it
h
b
u
il
t-
in
la
se
r
b
ea
m
25
M
ag
ic
T
ou
ch
21
.8
6
0.
08
7
53
9.
50
-5
32
.9
6
-5
.4
9
C
om
p
ac
t
w
om
en
-f
ri
en
d
ly
vi
b
ra
to
r
31
A
p
p
en
d
ix
T
a
b
le
A
1
.
(c
on
ti
nu
ed
)
#
N
am
e
A
ve
ra
ge
C
V
T
ea
m
S
al
es
P
ro
fi
ts
P
ro
fi
ts
/
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
of
p
ro
d
u
ct
/s
er
vi
ce
ab
il
it
y
ab
il
it
y
si
ze
(e
u
ro
s)
(e
u
ro
s)
sh
ar
e
26
M
u
✏
e
17
.7
8
0.
36
11
13
20
.7
6
33
1.
09
6.
13
T
re
n
d
y
co
↵
ee
to
-g
o
cu
p
sl
ee
ve
27
N
ai
lt
as
ti
c
17
.7
8
0.
15
10
28
4.
87
-2
84
.6
3
-7
.4
9
N
ai
lp
ol
is
h
ap
p
li
ca
to
r
h
el
p
ki
t
28
N
ew
Y
ou
n
g
P
ro
s
20
.4
3
0.
30
10
14
76
.4
8
79
4.
00
12
.4
1
A
nt
i-
sl
ip
m
at
fo
r
m
u
lt
ip
le
d
ev
ic
es
29
R
az
or
2G
o
18
.4
2
0.
08
13
38
7.
68
-1
13
.3
1
-1
.8
3
C
om
fo
rt
ab
le
fa
ci
al
h
ai
r
re
m
ov
er
30
R
eW
ri
te
14
.7
5
0.
25
11
16
00
.4
5
41
3.
39
6.
36
T
-s
h
ir
t
w
it
h
re
w
ri
ta
b
le
te
ks
t
ar
ea
31
R
is
in
g
S
u
n
14
.7
8
0.
30
11
57
7.
71
-1
13
.1
1
-4
.7
1
M
in
i
h
ig
h
-d
efi
n
it
io
n
p
en
ca
m
er
a
32
S
le
ev
ie
s
20
.1
3
0.
25
10
50
48
.5
0
16
19
.3
9
25
.7
0
P
u
b
li
c
tr
an
sp
or
t
ch
ip
ca
rd
h
ol
d
er
33
S
tu
d
.
O
↵
er
P
ro
d
u
ct
s
22
.2
2
0.
18
9
14
4.
18
-2
17
.7
4
-4
.3
5
A
id
s
aw
ar
en
es
s-
ra
is
in
g
ke
y
ch
ai
n
34
S
u
n
ny
&
C
o
14
.0
0
0.
25
10
65
3.
19
19
4.
73
4.
23
W
ri
st
b
an
d
w
it
h
su
n
sc
re
en
n
ot
ifi
er
35
S
u
n
V
is
io
n
20
.4
0
0.
17
10
39
1.
66
-1
97
.4
7
-5
.8
1
A
↵
or
d
ab
le
su
n
gl
as
se
s
on
st
re
n
gt
h
36
S
w
op
s
23
.2
2
0.
12
9
55
7.
15
11
2.
69
1.
28
T
re
n
d
y
d
ig
it
al
sl
im
sp
or
ts
w
at
ch
37
C
ar
d
h
ol
d
er
C
om
p
an
y
18
.1
1
0.
12
9
25
2.
10
-1
40
.0
0
-5
.6
0
C
ar
d
h
ol
d
er
w
al
le
t
w
it
h
m
ir
ro
r
38
T
h
e
M
u
g
20
.7
0
0.
15
13
20
19
.2
7
50
8.
46
5.
98
C
om
fo
rt
ab
le
co
↵
ee
to
-g
o
m
u
g
39
T
ie
S
u
p
p
ly
20
.3
8
0.
07
10
43
3.
74
-2
42
.8
6
-1
.8
0
T
ie
ro
ll
cy
li
n
d
er
in
a
tr
av
el
ca
se
40
T
oc
ca
re
21
.1
3
0.
12
15
46
3.
85
-2
25
.9
0
-5
.6
5
K
ey
ch
ai
n
w
it
h
d
ig
it
al
b
u
si
n
es
s
ca
rd
41
W
in
te
rw
ar
m
th
20
.1
1
0.
21
13
89
3.
28
48
0.
50
14
.5
6
M
u
lt
i-
p
u
rp
os
e
h
ot
an
d
co
ld
ge
l
p
ad
42
W
ri
st
b
an
d
s4
W
or
ld
17
.6
9
0.
14
14
59
6.
00
50
.8
8
1.
64
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l
aw
ar
en
es
s
w
ri
st
b
an
d
43
X
ih
e
20
.7
0
0.
09
11
86
0.
50
-9
93
.0
2
-1
0.
13
In
n
ov
at
iv
e
so
la
r
b
at
te
ry
ch
ar
ge
r
44
X
X
L
21
.0
8
0.
19
12
25
52
.9
1
23
8.
86
2.
91
H
E
S
U
n
iv
er
si
ty
h
oo
d
ed
sw
ea
ts
h
ir
t
45
B
u
b
b
le
B
ea
t
17
.7
5
0.
35
8
0.
00
-2
25
.0
0
-3
.8
8
n
/a
46
C
ot
to
n
&
C
la
ss
21
.2
5
0.
30
10
12
01
.0
0
-3
52
.0
0
-4
.6
9
n
/a
47
D
ec
en
t
19
.2
5
0.
08
13
21
0.
00
-2
.0
0
-0
.0
8
n
/a
48
In
O
 
ce
21
.1
1
0.
15
10
47
5.
00
15
4.
00
7.
33
n
/a
49
W
at
ch
U
s
21
.7
5
0.
10
13
71
6.
67
19
2.
50
8.
02
n
/a
N
ot
e:
A
ve
ra
ge
an
d
C
V
of
ab
il
it
y
re
fl
ec
t
at
th
e
te
am
le
ve
l
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
av
er
ag
e
sc
or
e
an
d
co
e 
ci
en
t
of
va
ri
at
io
n
in
sc
or
es
on
R
av
en
’s
ad
va
n
ce
d
p
ro
gr
es
si
ve
m
at
ri
ce
s
te
st
(e
x
cl
u
d
in
g
st
u
d
en
ts
w
h
os
e
te
st
sc
or
e
is
u
n
k
n
ow
n
).
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
er
of
st
u
d
en
ts
w
h
os
e
te
st
sc
or
e
is
u
n
k
n
ow
n
am
ou
n
ts
to
60
(o
u
t
of
57
3
st
u
d
en
ts
).
T
ea
m
si
ze
re
fl
ec
ts
th
e
si
ze
of
te
am
s
at
b
as
el
in
e.
M
is
si
n
g
or
in
co
m
p
le
te
d
es
cr
ip
ti
on
s
of
a
te
am
’s
p
ro
d
u
ct
or
se
rv
ic
e
ar
e
in
d
ic
at
ed
b
y
’n
/a
’
(n
ot
av
ai
la
b
le
).
32
Appendix Figure A1. Example of a figure from Raven’s advanced progressive matrices test
33
A
p
p
en
d
ix
T
a
b
le
A
2
.
O
th
er
m
ea
su
re
s
of
ab
il
it
y
d
is
p
er
si
on
an
d
te
am
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
S
al
es
P
ro
fi
ts
P
os
.
p
ro
fi
ts
P
ro
fi
ts
p
er
sh
ar
e
O
L
S
M
ed
ia
n
R
ob
u
st
O
L
S
M
ed
ia
n
R
ob
u
st
O
L
S
O
L
S
M
ed
ia
n
R
ob
u
st
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
A
:
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
d
ev
ia
ti
on
S
D
ab
il
it
y
95
5.
5*
*
37
0.
4
23
9.
7
54
8.
5*
**
53
8.
0*
*
41
2.
6*
*
0.
64
1*
**
7.
52
9*
*
6.
32
4*
6.
01
0*
*
(4
46
.4
)
(2
86
.2
)
(2
72
.0
)
(2
02
.6
)
(2
06
.4
)
(1
69
.9
)
(0
.1
95
)
(3
.1
31
)
(3
.6
50
)
(2
.7
65
)
S
D
ab
il
it
y2
-1
07
.6
**
-4
3.
7
-2
7.
7
-5
9.
4*
**
-6
5.
1*
*
-4
6.
9*
*
-0
.0
68
**
*
-0
.8
27
**
-0
.8
01
*
-0
.6
79
**
(4
8.
4)
(3
3.
4)
(3
2.
3)
(2
2.
0)
(2
4.
6)
(1
9.
2)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.3
39
)
(0
.4
24
)
(0
.3
14
)
A
vg
.
ab
il
it
y
18
.8
41
30
.4
51
-6
.5
46
11
.3
89
-2
.8
16
-0
.2
48
-0
.0
08
0.
16
3
-0
.0
83
0.
01
3
(5
7.
58
4)
(4
4.
30
7)
(3
6.
63
5)
(2
0.
70
6)
(2
3.
71
4)
(1
8.
42
2)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.3
86
)
(0
.4
62
)
(0
.3
64
)
M
ax
./
A
vg
.
4.
44
/3
.9
1
4.
24
/3
.9
1
4.
33
/3
.9
1
4.
62
/3
.9
1
4.
13
/3
.9
1
4.
40
/3
.9
1
4.
71
/3
.9
1
4.
55
/3
.9
1
3.
95
/3
.9
1
4.
43
/3
.9
1
R
2
0.
08
0.
03
0.
02
0.
15
0.
06
0.
12
0.
16
0.
10
0.
07
0.
08
B
:
R
at
io
m
ax
im
u
m
/m
in
im
u
m
R
at
io
ab
il
it
y
22
08
.6
**
10
37
.6
70
9.
8
84
3.
1
38
6.
5
51
2.
0
0.
84
9
10
.3
92
7.
45
9
7.
60
8
(1
04
3.
0)
(7
87
.2
)
(7
88
.1
)
(5
50
.5
)
(5
71
.2
)
(6
06
.1
)
(0
.6
83
)
(9
.2
55
)
(1
0.
15
4)
(1
0.
87
9)
R
at
io
ab
il
it
y2
-4
03
.5
*
-1
81
.8
-1
31
.9
-1
51
.5
-5
8.
3
-9
1.
0
-0
.1
40
-1
.8
51
-1
.1
27
-1
.3
42
(2
12
.2
)
(1
64
.0
)
(1
67
.3
)
(1
14
.9
)
(1
24
.1
)
(1
30
.6
)
(0
.1
46
)
(1
.9
08
)
(2
.2
14
)
(2
.3
52
)
A
vg
.
ab
il
it
y
43
.3
12
40
.9
83
7.
20
9
18
.0
76
13
.5
65
3.
95
6
0.
00
3
0.
24
2
0.
38
9
0.
08
9
(5
6.
44
4)
(4
1.
18
4)
(4
1.
24
7)
(2
3.
08
2)
(2
6.
87
0)
(2
2.
13
0)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.4
38
)
(0
.5
30
)
(0
.4
36
)
M
ax
./
A
vg
.
2.
74
/2
.1
7
2.
85
/2
.1
7
2.
69
/2
.1
7
2.
78
/2
.1
7
3.
31
/2
.1
7
2.
81
/2
.1
7
3.
03
/2
.1
7
2.
81
/2
.1
7
3.
31
/2
.1
7
2.
83
/2
.1
7
R
2
0.
10
0.
05
0.
04
0.
08
0.
03
0.
04
0.
08
0.
04
0.
03
0.
03
C
:
S
p
li
n
e
(0
.1
5
an
d
0.
30
)
1s
t
se
gm
en
t
90
22
.6
*
21
93
.0
18
6.
9
51
66
.3
*
50
85
.9
39
18
.4
7.
29
7*
*
55
.4
14
60
.5
02
51
.4
47
(N
=
12
)
(4
64
9.
3)
(4
64
3.
2)
(4
62
9.
7)
(2
70
2.
6)
(3
11
2.
3)
(2
75
4.
7)
(2
.9
60
)
(4
0.
25
4)
(5
3.
61
3)
(4
2.
57
9)
2n
d
se
gm
en
t
10
45
.1
40
8.
3
18
05
.1
11
20
.6
48
1.
3
44
1.
3
0.
75
9
17
.2
13
1.
70
9
10
.8
26
(N
=
24
)
(3
23
2.
4)
(2
60
0.
9)
(2
35
0.
0)
(1
49
3.
7)
(1
52
1.
2)
(1
68
7.
2)
(1
.8
14
)
(2
7.
22
7)
(3
2.
64
8)
(3
1.
89
6)
3r
d
se
gm
en
t
-8
01
4.
1
-2
88
7.
7
-4
48
4.
7
-4
16
2.
1
-4
54
8.
3
-3
42
9.
2
-2
.7
99
-5
7.
50
7
-6
1.
10
0
-4
8.
73
4
(N
=
13
)
(9
12
5.
7)
(7
34
2.
2)
(6
84
9.
5)
(3
32
9.
1)
(4
08
4.
8)
(4
57
6.
6)
(4
.5
42
)
(6
5.
00
5)
(7
1.
81
5)
(1
09
.8
26
)
A
vg
.
ab
il
it
y
21
.2
55
8.
26
9
-3
.9
39
17
.8
04
10
.6
06
3.
56
7
0.
00
1
0.
22
7
0.
13
0
0.
08
5
(6
5.
57
8)
(4
9.
19
3)
(4
2.
95
0)
(2
6.
90
9)
(2
9.
17
1)
(2
8.
29
1)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.4
77
)
(0
.5
50
)
(0
.5
11
)
R
2
0.
08
0.
04
0.
06
0.
14
0.
07
0.
10
0.
14
0.
08
0.
08
0.
07
N
ot
e
:
B
as
ed
on
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
fr
om
49
te
am
s.
In
p
an
el
A
av
er
ag
e
an
d
S
D
of
ab
il
it
y
re
fl
ec
t
at
th
e
te
am
le
ve
l
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
av
er
ag
e
sc
or
e
an
d
st
an
d
ar
d
d
ev
ia
ti
on
in
sc
or
es
on
R
av
en
’s
ad
va
n
ce
d
p
ro
gr
es
si
ve
m
at
ri
ce
s
te
st
.
In
p
an
el
B
av
er
ag
e
an
d
ra
ti
o
of
ab
il
it
y
re
fl
ec
t
at
th
e
te
am
le
ve
l
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
av
er
ag
e
sc
or
e
an
d
ra
ti
o
of
th
e
m
ax
im
u
m
to
th
e
m
in
im
u
m
sc
or
e
on
R
av
en
’s
ad
va
n
ce
d
p
ro
gr
es
si
ve
m
at
ri
ce
s
te
st
.
In
p
an
el
C
av
er
ag
e
an
d
C
V
of
ab
il
it
y
re
fl
ec
t
at
th
e
te
am
le
ve
l
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
av
er
ag
e
sc
or
e
an
d
co
e 
ci
en
t
of
va
ri
at
io
n
in
sc
or
es
on
R
av
en
’s
ad
va
n
ce
d
p
ro
gr
es
si
ve
m
at
ri
ce
s
te
st
(w
it
h
cu
to
↵
s
at
a
co
e 
ci
en
t
of
va
ri
at
io
n
in
te
st
sc
or
es
of
0.
15
an
d
0.
30
).
O
L
S
,
M
ed
ia
n
an
d
R
ob
u
st
re
fe
r
to
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n
m
et
h
o
d
.
M
ed
ia
n
an
d
ro
b
u
st
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
fo
r
p
os
it
iv
e
p
ro
fi
ts
ar
e
ex
cl
u
d
ed
si
n
ce
th
is
va
ri
ab
le
is
d
ic
h
ot
om
ou
s.
B
o
ot
st
ra
p
p
ed
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
(1
00
0
re
p
li
ca
ti
on
s)
.
**
*/
**
/*
d
en
ot
es
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1%
/5
%
/1
0%
-l
ev
el
.
34
A
p
p
en
d
ix
T
a
b
le
A
3
.
A
b
il
it
y
d
is
p
er
si
on
,
d
is
m
is
sa
ls
an
d
te
am
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
A
:
D
is
m
is
sa
ls
N
u
m
b
er
In
ci
d
en
ce
O
L
S
M
ed
ia
n
R
ob
u
st
O
L
S
C
V
ab
il
it
y
-1
4.
14
0*
**
-1
8.
22
7*
*
-1
3.
05
7*
*
-8
.4
16
**
*
(4
.1
54
)
(8
.3
99
)
(5
.5
23
)
(3
.2
60
)
C
V
ab
il
it
y2
29
.5
25
**
*
38
.4
75
**
28
.6
81
**
*
17
.1
91
**
*
(8
.1
36
)
(1
7.
09
1)
(1
0.
26
4)
(6
.4
89
)
A
vg
.
ab
il
it
y
0.
01
8
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
07
0.
01
2
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
24
)
M
in
im
u
m
0.
24
0.
24
0.
23
0.
24
R
2
0.
37
0.
03
0.
36
0.
25
B
:
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
S
al
es
P
ro
fi
ts
P
os
.
p
ro
fi
ts
P
ro
fi
ts
p
er
sh
ar
e
O
L
S
M
ed
ia
n
R
ob
u
st
O
L
S
M
ed
ia
n
R
ob
u
st
O
L
S
O
L
S
M
ed
ia
n
R
ob
u
st
D
is
m
is
sa
ls
-5
72
.6
**
*
-2
83
.5
-2
78
.9
*
-1
93
.0
**
-1
76
.0
-1
85
.2
*
-0
.2
09
-3
.2
70
*
-4
.3
92
**
-3
.1
20
*
(n
u
m
b
er
)
(1
89
.1
)
(2
02
.5
)
(1
64
.4
)
(9
0.
5)
(1
27
.4
)
(9
8.
8)
(0
.1
29
)
(1
.7
75
)
(1
.9
88
)
(1
.8
74
)
R
2
0.
13
0.
05
0.
10
0.
07
0.
05
0.
10
0.
07
0.
07
0.
06
0.
08
D
is
m
is
sa
ls
-7
74
.2
**
*
-3
55
.2
-4
30
.0
**
-2
44
.3
**
-1
64
.0
-2
23
.4
*
-0
.2
59
-4
.6
53
**
-4
.0
57
-4
.0
38
*
(i
n
ci
d
en
ce
)
(2
69
.1
)
(2
85
.5
)
(2
08
.7
)
(1
23
.7
)
(1
66
.8
)
(1
27
.8
)
(0
.1
66
)
(2
.0
33
)
(2
.7
68
)
(2
.1
37
)
R
2
0.
14
0.
06
0.
14
0.
06
0.
03
0.
09
0.
06
0.
08
0.
04
0.
08
N
ot
e
:
B
as
ed
on
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
fr
om
49
te
am
s.
A
ve
ra
ge
an
d
C
V
of
ab
il
it
y
re
fl
ec
t
at
th
e
te
am
le
ve
l
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
av
er
ag
e
sc
or
e
an
d
co
e 
ci
en
t
of
va
ri
at
io
n
in
sc
or
es
on
R
av
en
’s
ad
va
n
ce
d
p
ro
gr
es
si
ve
m
at
ri
ce
s
te
st
.
A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
co
n
tr
ol
fo
r
te
am
si
ze
.
O
L
S
,
M
ed
ia
n
an
d
R
ob
u
st
re
fe
r
to
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n
m
et
h
o
d
.
M
ed
ia
n
an
d
ro
b
u
st
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
fo
r
in
ci
d
en
ce
of
d
is
m
is
sa
ls
an
d
p
os
it
iv
e
p
ro
fi
ts
ar
e
ex
cl
u
d
ed
si
n
ce
th
es
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
d
ic
h
ot
om
ou
s.
B
o
ot
st
ra
p
p
ed
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
(1
00
0
re
p
li
ca
ti
on
s)
.
**
*/
**
/*
d
en
ot
es
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1%
/5
%
/1
0%
-l
ev
el
.
35
